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Abstract
This paper presents the basic elements of a computational theory
of discourse structure that simplifies and expands upon previous
work. By specifying the basic units a discourse comprises and
the ways in which they can relate, an account of discourse
structure provides the basis for an account of discourse meaning.
The paper distinguishes three components of discourse structure:
one linguistic, one intentional, and one attentional. The
theory, although still incomplete, provides a basis for
investigating the structure and meaning of discourse, as well as
for constructing "discourse processing systems."
1. Introduction
This paper presents the basic elements of a computational
theory of discourse structure that simplifies and expands upon
previous work. By specifying the basic units a discourse
comprises and the ways in which they can relate, an account of
discourse structure provides the basis for an account of
discourse meaning. An account of discourse structure also plays
a central role in language processing because it stipulates
constraints on those portions of a discourse to which any given
utterance in the discourse must be related.
An account of discourse structure is closely related to two
questions: What individuates a discourse? What makes it
coherent? That is, faced with a sequence of utterances, how does
one know whether they constitute a single discourse, several
(perhaps interleaved) discourses, or none? As we develop it, the
theory of discourse will be seen to be connected intimately with
two nonlinguistic notions: intention and attention. Attention
is an essential factor in explicating the processing of
utterances in discourse. Intentions play a primary role in
explaining discourse structure, defining discourse coherence, and
providing a coherent conceptualization of the term "discourse"
itself.
The theory is a further development and integration of two
lines of research: work on focusing in discourse (Grosz, 1978a,
1978b, 1981), and more recent work on intention recognition in
discourse (Sidner, 1983, 1985; Sidner, & Israel, 1981; Allen,
1983; Litman, 1985; and Pollack, 1986). Our goal has been to
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generalize these constructs properly to a wide range of discourse
types. Grosz (1978) demonstrated that the notions of focusing
and task structure are necessary for understanding and producing
task-oriented dialogue. One of the main generalizations of
previous work will be to show that discourses are generally in
some sense "task-oriented," but the kinds of "tasks" that can be
engaged in are quite varied--some are physical, some mental,
others linguistic. Consequently, the term "task" is misleading;
we therefore will use the more general terminology of intentions
(e.g., when speaking of discourse purposes) for most of what we
say.
Our main thesis is that the structure of any discourse is a
composite of three distinct but interacting components: (1) the
structure of the actual sequence of utterances in the discourse;
(2) a structure of intentions; (3) an attentional state. The
distinction among these components is essential to an explanation
of interruptions (see Section 5), as well as to explanations of
the use of certain types of referring expressions (see Section
4.2) and various other expressions that affect discourse
segmentation and structure (see Section 6). Most related work on
discourse structure (including Reichman, 1984; Linde, 1979; Linde
& Goguen, 1978; and Cohen, 1983), fails to distinguish among some
(or, in some cases, all) of these components. As a result,
significant generalizations are lost, and the computational
mechanisms proposed are more complex than necessary. By
carefully distinguishing these components, we are able to account
for significant observations in this related work while
simplifying both the explanations given and computational
mechanisms used.
In addition to explicating these linguistic phenomena, the
theory provides an overall framework within which to answer
questions about the relevance of various segments of discourse to
one another and to the overall purposes of the discourse
participants. Various properties of the intentional component
have implications for research in natural-language processing in
general. In particular, the intentions that underlie discourse
are so diverse that approaches to discourse coherence based on
selecting discourse relationships from a fixed set of alternative
rhetorical patterns (e.g., Hobbs, 1979; Mann & Thompson, 1983;
and Reichman, 1981) are unlikely to suffice. The intentional
structure that is introduced in this paper depends instead on a
small number of structural relations that can hold between
intentions. This study also reveals several problems that must
be confronted in expanding speech-act-related theories (e.g.,
Allen & Perrault, 1980; Cohen & Levesque, 1980; and Allen, 1983)
from coverage of individual utterances to coverage of extended
sequences of utterances in discourse.
Although a definition of "discourse" must await further
development of the theory presented in this paper, some
properties of the phenomena we want to explain must be specified
now. In particular, we take a discourse to be a piece of
language behavior that typically involves multiple utterances and
multiple participants. A discourse may be produced by one or more
of these participants as speakers or writers; the audience may
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comprise one or more of the participants as hearers or readers.
Because in multiparty conversations more than one participant may
speak (or write) different utterances within a segment, the terms
"speaker" and "hearer" do not differentiate the unique roles that
the participants maintain in a segment of a conversation. We
will therefore use the terms initiating conversational
participant (ICP) and other conversational participant(s) (OCP)
to distinguish the initiator of a discourse segment from its
other participants. The ICP speaks (or writes) the first
utterance of a segment, but an OCP may be the speaker of some
subsequent utterances. By speaking of ICPs and OCPs, we can
highlight the purposive aspect of discourse. We will use the
terms speaker and hearer only when the particular
speaking/hearing activity is important for the point being made.
In most of this paper, we will be concerned with developing
an abstract model of discourse structure; in particular, the
definitions of the components will abstract away from the details
of the discourse participants. Whether one constructs a computer
system that can participate in a discourse (i.e., one that is a
language user) or defines a psychological theory of language use,
the task will require the appropriate projection of this abstract
model onto properties of a language user, and specification of
additional details (e.g., specifying memory for linguistic
structure, means for encoding attentional state, and appropriate
representations of intentional structure). We do, however,
address ourselves directly to certain processing issues that are
essential to the computational validity of the [abstract] model
and to its utilization for a language-processing system or
psychological theory.
Finally, it is important to note that although discourse
meaning is a significant, unsolved problem, we will not address
it in this paper. An adequate theory of discourse meaning needs
to rest at least partially on an adequate theory of discourse
structure. Our concern is with providing the latter.
The next section examines the basic theory of discourse
structure and presents an overview of each of the components of
discourse structure. Section 3 analyzes two sample discourses--a
written text and a fragment of task-oriented dialogue--from the
perspective of the theory being developed; these two examples are
also used to illustrate various points in the remainder of the
paper. Section 4 investigates various processing issues that the
theory raises. The following two sections describe the role of
the discourse structure components in explaining various
properties of discourse, thereby corroborating the necessity of
distinguishing among its three components. Section 7 describes
the generalization from utterance-level to discourse-level
intentions, establishes certain properties of the latter, and
contrasts them with the rhetorical relations of alternative
theories. Finally, Section 8 poses a number of outstanding
research questions suggested by the theory.
2. The Basic Theory
Discourse structure is a composite of three interacting
constituents: a linguistic structure, an intentional structure,
and an attentional state. These three constituents of discourse
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structure deal with different aspects of the utterances in a
discourse. Utterances--the actual saying or writing of
particular sequences of phrases and clauses--are the linguistic
structure's basic elements. Intentions of a particular sort and
a small number of relationships between them provide the basic
elements of the intentional structure. Attentional state
contains information about the objects, properties, relations,
and discourse intentions that are most salient at any given
point. It is an abstraction of the focus of attention of the
discourse participants; it serves to summarize information from
previous utterances crucial for processing subsequent ones thus
obviating the need for keeping a complete history of the
discourse.
Together the three constituents of discourse structure
supply the information needed by the CPs to determine how an
individual utterance fits with the rest of the discourse--in
essence, enabling them to figure out why it was said and what it
means. The context provided by these constituents also forms the
basis for certain expectations about what is to come; these
expectations play a role in accommodating new utterances. The
attentional state serves an additional purpose: namely, it
furnishes the means for actually using the information in the
other two structures in generating and interpreting individual
utterances.
2.1 Linguistic Structure
The first component of discourse structure is the structure
of the sequence of utterances that comprise a discourse.1 Just
as the words in a single sentence form constituent phrases, the
utterances in a discourse are naturally aggregated into discourse
segments. The utterances in a segment, like the words in a
phrase, serve particular roles with respect to that segment. In
addition, the discourse segments, like the phrases, fulfill
certain functions with respect to the overall discourse.
Although two consecutive utterances may be in the same discourse
segment, it is also common for two consecutive utterances to be
in different segments. It is also possible for two utterances
that are nonconsecutive to be in the same segment.
The factoring of discourses into segments has been observed
across a wide range of discourse types. Grosz (1978) showed this
for task-oriented dialogues. Linde (1979) found it valid for
descriptions of apartments; Linde and Goguen (1978) describe such
structuring in the Watergate transcripts. Reichman (1984)
observed it in informal debates, explanations, and therapeutic
discourse. Cohen (1983) found similar structures in essays in
rhetorical texts. Polanyi and Scha (1986) discuss this feature
of narrative.
Although different researchers with different theories have
examined a variety of discourse types and found discourse-level
segmentation, there has been very little investigation of the
extent of agreement about where the segment boundaries lie.
There have been no psychological studies of the consistency of
recognition of section boundaries. However, Mann (1975) asked
several people to segment a set of dialogues. He has reported
[personal communication] that his subjects segmented the
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discourses approximately the same; their disagreements were about
utterances at the boundaries of segments. 2 Several studies of
spontaneously produced discourses provide additional evidence of
the existence of segment boundaries, as well as suggesting some
of the linguistic cues available for detecting boundaries. Chafe
(1979, 1980) found differences in pause lengths at segment
boundaries. Butterworth (1975) found speech rate differences
that correlated with segments; speech rate is slower at start of
a segment than toward the end.
The linguistic structure consists of the discourse segments
and an embedding relationship that can hold between them. As we
discuss in Sections 2.2 and 5, the embedding relationships are a
surface reflection of relationships among elements of the
intentional structure. It is important to recognize that the
linguistic structure is not strictly decompositional. An
individual segment may include a combination of subsegments and
utterances only in that segment (and not members of any of its
embedded subsegments). Both of the examples in Section 3 exhibit
such nonstrict decompositionality. Because the linguistic
structure is not strictly decompositional, various properties of
the discourse (most notably the intentional structure) are
functions of properties of individual utterances and properties
of segments.
There is a two-way interaction between the discourse segment
structure and the utterances constituting the discourse:
linguistic expressions can be used to convey information about
the discourse structure; conversely, the discourse structure
constrains the interpretation of expressions (and hence affects
what a speaker says and how a hearer will interpret what is
said). Not surprisingly, linguistic expressions are among the
primary indicators of discourse segment boundaries. The explicit
use of certain words and phrases (e.g., "in the first place") and
more subtle cues, such as intonation or changes in tense and
aspect, are included in the repertoire of linguistic devices that
function, wholly or in part, to indicate these boundaries (Grosz,
1978; Reichman, 1984; Cohen, 1983; Polanyi & Scha, 1983; and
Hirschberg & Pierrehumbert, 1986). Reichman (1981) discusses
some words that function in this way and coined the term "clue"
words. We will use the term "cue phrases" to generalize on her
observation as well as many others because each one of these
devices cue the hearer to some change in the discourse structure.
As discussed in Section 6, these linguistic boundary markers
can be divided according to whether they explicitly indicate
changes in the intentional structure or in the attentional state
of the discourse. The differential use of these linguistic
markers provides one piece of evidence for considering these two
components to be distinct. Because these linguistic devices
function explicitly as indicators of discourse structure, it
becomes clear that they are best seen as providing information at
the discourse level, and not at that of the sentence; hence,
certain kinds of questions (e.g., about their contribution to the
truth conditions of an individual sentence) do not make sense.
For example, in the utterance "Incidentally, Jane swims every
day," the "incidentally" indicates an interruption of the main
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flow of discourse rather than affecting in anyway the meaning of
"Jane swims every day." Jane's swimming every day could hardly
be fortuitous.
Just as linguistic devices affect structure, so the
discourse segmentation affects the interpretation of linguistic
expressions in a discourse. Referring expressions provide the
primary example of this effect.3 The segmentation of discourse
constrains the use of referring expressions by delineating
certain points at which there is a significant change in what
entities (objects, properties, or relations) are being discussed.
For example, there are different constraints on the use of
pronouns and reduced definite-noun phrases within a segment than
across segment boundaries. While discourse segmentation is
obviously not the only factor governing the use of referring
expressions, it is an important one.
2.2. Intentional Structure
A rather straightforward property of discourses, namely,
that they (or, more accurately, those who participate in them)
have an overall purpose; turns out to play a fundamental role in
the theory of discourse structure. In particular, some of the
purposes that underlie discourses, and their component segments,
provide the means of individuating discourses and of
distinguishing discourses that are coherent from those that are
not. These purposes also make it possible to determine when a
sequence of utterances comprises more than one discourse.
Although typically the participants in a discourse may have
more than one aim in participating in the discourse (e.g., a
story may entertain its listeners as well as describe an event;
an argument may establish a person's brilliance as well as
convince someone that a claim or allegation is true), we
distinguish one of these purposes as foundational to the
discourse. We will refer to it as the discourse purpose (DP).
From an intuitive perspective, the discourse purpose is the
intention that underlies engaging in the particular discourse.
This intention provides both the reason a discourse (a linguistic
act), rather than some other action, is being performed and the
reason the particular content of this discourse is being conveyed
rather than some other information. For each of the discourse
segments, we can also single out one intention--the discourse
segment purpose (DSP). From an intuitive standpoint, the DSP
specifies how this segment contributes to achieving the overall
discourse purpose. The assumption that there are single such
intentions will in the end prove too strong. However, this
assumption allows us to describe the basic theory more clearly.
We must leave to future research (and a subsequent paper) the
exploration and discussion of the complications that result from
relaxing this assumption.
Typically, an ICP will have a number of different kinds of
intentions that lead to initiating a discourse. One kind might
include intentions to speak in a certain language or to utter
certain words. Another might include intentions to amuse or to
impress. The kinds of intentions that can serve as discourse
purposes or discourse segment purposes are distinguished from
other intentions by the fact that they are intended to be
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recognized (cf. Allen & Perrault, 1980; Sidner, 1985), whereas
other intentions are private; that is, the recognition of the DP
or DSP is essential to its achieving its intended effect.
Discourse purposes and discourse segment purposes share this
property with certain utterance-level intentions that Grice
(1969) uses in defining utterance meaning (see Section 7).
It is important to distinguish intentions that are intended
to be recognized from other kinds of intentions that are
associated with discourse. Intentions that are intended to be
recognized achieve their intended effect only if the intention is
recognized. For example, a compliment achieves its intended
effect only if the intention to compliment is recognized: in
contrast, a scream of "boo" typically achieves its intended
effect (scaring the hearer) without the hearer having to
recognize the speaker's intention.
Some intention that is private and not intended to be
recognized may be the primary motivation for an ICP to begin a
discourse. For example, the ICP may intend to impress someone or
may plan to teach someone. In neither case is the ICP's
intention necessarily intended to be recognized. Quite the
opposite may be true in the case of impressing, as the ICP may
not want the OCP to be aware of his intention. When teaching,
the ICP may not care whether the OCP knows the ICP is teaching
him or her. Thus, the primary intention that motivates the ICP
to engage in a discourse may be private. By contrast, the
discourse segment purpose is always intended to be recognized.
DPs and DSPs are basically the same sorts of intentions. If
an intention is a DP, then its satisfaction is a main purpose of
the discourse, whereas if it is a DSP, then its satisfaction
contributes to the satisfaction of the DP. The following are
some of the types of intentions that could serve as DP/DSPs,
followed by one example of each type.
(1) Intend that some agent intend to perform
some physical task. Example: Intend that Ruth
intend to fix the flat tire.
(2) Intend that some agent believe some fact.
Example: Intend that Ruth believe the campfire
has started.
(3) Intend that some agent believe that one fact
supports another. Example: Intend that Ruth
believe the smell of smoke provides evidence that
the campfire is started.
(4) Intend that some agent intend to identify an
object (existing physical object, imaginary
object, plan, event, event sequence). Example:
Intend that Ruth intend to identify my bicycle.
(5) Intend that some agent know some property of an
object. Example: Intend that Ruth know that my
bicycle has a flat tire.
We have identified two structural relations that play an
important role in discourse structure: dominance and
satisfaction-precedence. An action that satisfies one intention,
say DSP1, may be intended to provide part of the satisfaction of
another, say DSP2. When this is the case, we will say that DSP1
contributes to DSP2; conversely, we will say that DSP2 dominates
DSP1 (or DSP2 DOM DSPl). The dominance relation invokes a partial
ordering on DSPs that we will refer to as the dominance
hierarchy. For some discourses, including task-oriented ones,
the order in which the DSPs are satisfied may be significant, as
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well as being intended to be recognized. We will say that DSP1
satisfaction-precedes DSP2 (or, DSP1 SP DSP2 whenever DSP1 must
be satisfied before DSP2.4
Any of the intentions on the preceding list could be either
a DP or a DSP. Furthermore, a given instance of any one of them
could contribute to another, or to a different instance of the
same type. For example, the intention that someone intend to
identify some object might dominate several intentions that she
or he know some property of that object; likewise, the intention
to get someone to believe some fact might dominate a number of
contributing intentions that that person believe other facts.
As the above list makes clear, the .range of intentions that
can serve as discourse, or discourse segment, purposes is open-
ended (cf. Wittgenstein, 1953, paragraph 23), much like the range
of intentions that underlie more general purposeful action.
There is no finite list of discourse purposes, as there is, say,
of syntactic categories. It remains an unresolved research
question whether there is a finite description of the open-ended
set of such intentions. However, even if there were finite
descriptions, there would still be no finite list of intentions
from which to choose. Thus, a theory of discourse structure
cannot depend on choosing the DP/DSPs from a fixed list (cf.
Reichman, 1984; Schank, Collins, Davis, Johnson, Lytinen, &
Reiser, 1982; and Mann & Thompson, 1983), nor on the particulars
of individual intentions. Although the particulars of individual
intentions, like a wide range of common sense knowledge, are
crucial to understanding any discourse, such particulars cannot
serve as the basis for determining discourse structure.
What is essential for discourse structure is that such
intentions bear certain kinds of structural relationships to one
another. Since the CPs can never know the whole set of
intentions that might serve as DP/DSPs, what they must recognize
is the relevant structural relationships among intentions.
Although there is an infinite number of intentions, there are
only a small number of relations relevant to discourse structure
that can hold between them.
In this paper we distinguish between the determination of
the DSP and the recognition of it. We will use the term
determination to refer to a semantic-like notion, namely, the
complete specification of what is intended by whom; we will use
the term recognition to refer to a processing notion, namely, the
processing that leads a discourse participant to identify what
the intention is. These are obviously related concepts; the same
information that determines a DSP may be used by an OCP to
recognize it. However, some questions are relevant to only one
of them. For example, the question of when the information
becomes available is not relevant to determination but is crucial
to recognition. An analogous distinction has been drawn with
respect to sentence structure; the parse tree (determination) is
differentiated from the parsing process (recognition) that
produces the tree.
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2.3. Attentional State
The third component of discourse structure, the attentional
state, is an abstraction of the participants' focus of attention
as their discourse unfolds. The attentional state is a property
of the discourse itself, not of the discourse participants. It
is inherently dynamic, recording the objects, properties, and
relations that are salient at each point in the discourse. The
attentional state is modeled by a set of focus spaces; changes in
attentional state are modeled by a set of transition rules that
specify the conditions for adding and deleting spaces. We call
the collection of focus spaces available at any one time the
focusing structure and the process of manipulating spaces
focusing.
The focusing process associates a focus space with each
discourse segment; this space contains those entities that are
salient--either because they have been mentioned explicitly in
the segment or because they became salient in the process of
producing or comprehending the utterances in the segment (as in
the original work on focusing Grosz, 1978a). The focus space also
includes the DSP; the inclusion of the purpose reflects the fact
that the CPs are focused not only on what they are talking about,
but also on why they are talking about it.
To understand the attentional state component of discourse
structure, it is important not to confuse it with two other
concepts. First, the attentional state component is not
equivalent to the cognitive state, but is only one of its
components. Cognitive state is a richer structure, one that
includes at least the knowledge, beliefs, desires, and intentions
of an agent, as well as the cognitive correlates of the
attentional state as modeled in this paper. Second, although
each focus space contains a DSP, the focus structure does not
include the intentional structure as a whole.
Figure 2-1 illustrates how the focusing structure, in
addition to modeling attentional state, serves during processing
to coordinate the linguistic and intentional structures. The
discourse segments (to the left of the figure) are tied to focus
spaces (drawn vertically down the middle of the figure). The
focusing structure is a stack. Information in lower spaces is
usually accessible from higher ones (but less so than the
information in the higher spaces); we will use a line with
intersecting hash marks to denote when this is not the case.
Subscripted terms are used to indicate the relevant contents of
the focus spaces because the spaces contain representations of
entities (i.e., objects, properties, and relations) and not
Part one of Figure 2-1 shows the state of focusing when
discourse segment DS2 is being processed. Segment DS1 gave rise
to FS1 and had as its discourse purpose DSP1 . The properties,
objects, relations, and purpose represented in FS1 are accessible
but less salient than those in FS2. DS2 yields a focus space
that is stacked relative to FS1 because DSP1 in FS1 dominates
DS2's DSP, DSP 2 . As a result of the relationship between FS1
and FS2, reduced noun phrases will be interpreted differently in
DS2 than in DS1. For example, if some red balls exist in the
world one of which is represented in FS2 and another in FS1, then
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FIGURE 2-1 DISCOURSE SEGMENTS, FOCUS SPACES, AND DOMINANCE HIERARCHY
"the red ball" used in DS2 will be understood to mean the
particular red ball that is represented in FS2. If, however,
there is also a green truck (in the world) and it is represented
only in FS1, "the green truck" uttered in DS2 will be understood
as referring to that green truck.
Part two of Figure 2-1 shows the state of focusing when
segment DS3 is being processed. FS2 has been popped from the
stack and FS3 has been pushed onto it because the DSP of FS3,
DSP 3, is dominated solely by DSP1 , not by DSP 2 . In this example,
the intentional structure includes only dominance relationships,
although, it may, in general, also include satisfaction-
precedence relationships.
The stacking of focus spaces reflects the relative salience
of the entities in each space during the corresponding segment's
portion of the discourse. The stack relationships arise from the
ways in which the various DSPs relate; information about such
relationships is represented in the dominance hierarchy (depicted
on the right in the figure). The spaces in Figure 2-1 are
snapshots illustrating the results of a sequence of operations,
such as pushes onto and pops from a stack. A push occurs when
the DSP for a new segment contributes to the DSP for the
immediately preceding segment. When the DSP contributes to some
intention higher in the dominance hierarchy, several focus spaces
are popped from the stack before the new one is inserted.
Two essential properties of the focusing structure are now
clear. First, the focusing structure is parasitic upon the
intentional structure, in the sense that the relationships among
I
I
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DSPs determine pushes and pops. Note, however, that the relevant
operation may sometimes be indicated in the language itself. For
example, the cue word "first" often indicates the start of a
segment whose DSP contributes to the DSP of the preceding
segment. Second, the focusing structure, like the intentional
and linguistic structures, evolves as the discourse proceeds.
None of them exists a priori. Even in those rare cases in which
an ICP has a complete plan for the discourse prior to uttering a
single word, the intentional structure is constructed by the CPs
as the discourse progresses. This discourse-time construction of
the intentional structure may be more obviously true for speakers
and hearers of spoken discourse than for readers and writers of
texts, but, even for the writer, the intentional structure is
developed as the text is being written.
Figure 2-1 illustrates some fundamental distinctions between
the intentional and attentional components of discourse
structure. First, the dominance hierarchy provides, among other
things, a complete record of the discourse-level intentions and
their dominance (as well as, when relevant, satisfaction-
precedence) relationships, whereas the focusing structure at any
one time can essentially contain only information that is
relevant to purposes in a portion of the dominance hierarchy.
Second, at the conclusion of a discourse, if it completes
normally, the focus stack will be empty, while the intentional
structure will have been fully constructed. Third, when the
discourse is being processed, only the attentional state can
constrain the interpretation of referring expressions directly.
We can now also clarify some misinterpretations of focus-
space diagrams and task structure in our earlier work (Grosz,
1978, 1981; Grosz, 1974). The focus-space hierarchies in that
work are best seen as representing attentional state. The task
structure was used in two ways: (1) to represent common
knowledge about the task; (2) as a special case of the
intentional structure we posit in this paper. Although the same
representational scheme was used for encoding the focus-space
hierarchies and the task structure (partitioned networks Hendrix,
1979), the two structures were distinct.
Several researchers (e.g., Linde & Goguen, 1978; Reichman,
1984) misinterpreted the original research in an unfortunate and
unintended way; they took the focus-space hierarchy to include
(or be identical to) the task structure. The conflation of these
two structures forces a single structure to contain information
about attentional state, intentional relationships, and general
task knowledge. It prevents a theory from accounting adequately
for certain aspects of discourse, including interruptions (see
Section 5).
A second instance of confusion was to infer (incorrectly)
that the task structure was necessarily a prebuilt tree. If the
task structure is taken to be a special case of intentional
structure, it becomes clear that the tree structure is simply a
more constrained structure than one might require for other
discourses; the nature of the task related to the task-oriented
discourse is such that the dominance hierarchy of the intentional
structure of the dialogue has both dominance and satisfaction-
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precedence relationships,5 while other discourses may not exhibit
significant precedence constraints among the DSPs. Furthermore,
there has never been any reason to assume that the task
structures in task-oriented dialogues are prebuilt, any more than
in the intentional structure of any other kind of discourse. It
is rather that one objective of discourse theory (not a topic
considered here, however) is to explain how the OCP builds up a
model of the task structure by using information supplied in the
discourse.
However, it is important to note that conflating the
aforementioned two roles of information about the task itself (as
a portion of general commonsense knowledge and as a special case
of intentional structure) was regrettable, as it fails to make an
important distinction. Furthermore, as is clear when intentional
structures are considered more generally, such a conflation of
roles does not allow for differences between what one knows about
a task and one's intentions for (or what one makes explicit in
discourse about) performing a task.
In summary, the focusing structure is the central repository
for the contextual information needed to process utterances at
each point in the discourse. It distinguishes those objects,
properties, and relations that are most salient at that point
and, moreover, has links to relevant parts of both the linguistic
and intentional structures. During a discourse, an increasing
amount of information, only some of which continues to be needed
for the interpretation of subsequent utterances, is discussed.
Hence, it becomes more and more necessary to be able to identify
relevant discourse segments, the entities they make salient, and
their DSPs. The role of attentional state in delineating the
information necessary for understanding is thus central to
discourse processing.
3. Two Examples
To illustrate the basic theory we have just sketched, we
will give a brief analysis of two kinds of discourse: an
argument from a rhetoric text and a task-oriented dialogue. For
each example we will discuss the segmentation of the discourse,
the intentions that underlie this segmentation, and the
relationships among the various DSPs. In each case, we will
point out some of the linguistic devices used to indicate segment
boundaries as well as some of the expressions whose
interpretations depend on those boundaries. The analysis is
concerned with specifying certain aspects of the behavior to be
explicated by a theory of discourse; the remainder of the paper
provides a partial account of this behavior.
3.1 An Argument
Our first example is an argument taken from a rhetoric text
(Holmes & Gallagher, 1917);6 it is an example used by Cohen
(1983) in her work on the structure of arguments. Figure 3-1
shows the dialogue and the eight discourse segments of which it
is composed. The division of the argument into separate
(numbered) clauses is Cohen's, but our analysis of the discourse
structure is different, since in Cohen's analysis, every
utterance is directly subordinated to another utterance, and
there is only one structure to encode linguistic segmentation and
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the purposes of utterances. Although both analyses segment
utterance (4) separately from utterances (1-3), some readers
place this utterance in DS1 with utterances (1) through (3);
this is an example of the kind of disagreement about boundary
utterances found in Mann's data (as discussed in Section 2.1).
The two placements lead to slightly different DSPs, but not
radically different intentional structures. Because the
differences do not affect the major thrust of the argument, we
will discuss only one segmentation.
DS1 1. The "movies" are so attractive to the great American public,
2. especially to young people,
3. that it is time to take careful thought about their effect on mind
Sand morals.
DS2 4. Ought any parent to permit his children to attend a moving picture
show often or without being quite certain of the show he permits
them to see?
DS3 5. No one can ceny, of course, that great educational and ethical
gains may be made through the movies
6. because of their astonishing vividness.
DS4 7. But the imrportant fact to be determined is the total result of
continuous and indiscriminate attendance on shows of this kind.
8. Can it be other than harmful?
DS5 9. In the first place the character of the plays is seldom of the
best.
10. One has only to read the ever-present "movie" billboard to see how
cheap, melodramatic and vulgar most of the photoplays are.
DS6 11. Even the best plays, moreover, are bound to be exciting and
over-emotional.
DS7 12. Without spoken words, facial expression and gesture must carry the
meaning:
13. but only strong emotion, or buffoonery can be represented through
facial expression and gesture.
14. The more reasonable and quiet aspects of life are necessarily
neglected.
15. How can our young people drink in through their eyes a continuous
spectacle of intense and strained activity and feeling without
harmful effects?
•so
Figure 3-2 lists the primary component of the DSP for each
of these segments and Figure 3-3 shows the dominance
relationships that hold among these intentions. In Section 7 we
discuss additional components of the discourse segment purpose;
because these additional components are more important for
completeness of the theory than for determining the essential
dominance and satisfaction-precedence relationships between DSPs,
we omit such details here. Rather than commit ourselves to a
formal language in which to express the intentions of the
discourse, we will use a shorthand notation and English sentences
that are intended to be a gloss for a formal statement of the
actual intentions.
10: (Intend ICP (Believe OCP PO))
where PO = the proposition that parents and teachers
should guard the young from overindulgence in the
movies.
11: (Intend ICP (Believe OCP Pl))
where P1 = the proposition that it is time to consider
the effect of movies on mind and morals.
12: (Intend ICP (Believe OCP P2))
where P2 = the proposition that young people cannot
drink in through their eyes a continuous spectacle of
intense and strained activity without harmful effects.
13: (Intend ICP (Believe OCP P3))
where P3 = the proposition that it is undeniable that
great educational and ethical gains may be made through
the movies.
14: (Intend ICP (Believe OCP P4))
where P4 = the proposition that although there are gains,
the total result of continuous and indiscriminate
attendance at movies is harmful.
Figure 3-I: The Movies Essay
16. Parents and teachers will do well to guard the young against
overindulgence in the taste for the "movie".
DSO
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15: (Intend ICP (Believe OCP P5))
where P5 - the proposition that the content of movies
(i.e., the character of the plays) is not the best.
16: (Intend ICP (Believe OCP P6))
where P6 = the proposition that the stories (i.e., the
plays) in movies are exciting and over-emotional.
17: (Intend ICP (Believe OCP P7))
where P7 = the proposition that movies portray strong
emotion and buffoonery while neglecting the quiet and
reasonable aspects of life.
Figure 3-2: Primary Intentions of the DSPs for Movies Essay
Dominance Relationships:
10 DOM Il
10 DOM 12
12 DOM 13
12 DOM 14
14 DOM 15
14 DOM 16
16 DOM 17
Figure 3-3: Dominance Relationships for the DSPs of the Movies Essay
All the primary intentions for this essay are intentions
that the reader (OCP) come to believe some proposition. Some of
these propositions, such as P5 and P6, can be read off the
surface utterances directly. Other propositions and the
intentions of which they are part, such as P2 and 12, are more
indirect. Like the Gricean utterance-level intentions (the
analogy with these will be explored in Section 7), DSPs
may or may not be directly expressed in the discourse. In
particular, they may be expressed in any of the following ways:
(1) explicitly as in "I intend for you to believe that it's
time to consider the effects of movies on mind and morals."
[which would produce Il]
(2) directly, in one utterance, as in (3) [which does
produce II]
(3) directly, through multiple utterances, as in using (7)
and the utterance "It can only be harmful" to produce 14,
(4) by derivation, in one or more utterances with an
associated context, as in (15) to produce 12.
Not only may information about the DSP be conveyed by a
number of features of the utterances in a discourse, but it also
may come in any utterance in a segment. For example, although 10
is the DP, it is stated directly only in the last utterance of
the essay. This leads to a number of questions about the ways in
which OCPs can recognize discourse purposes, and about those
junctures at which they need to do so. We turn to these matters
directly in Subsection 4.1.
This discourse also provides several examples of the
different kinds of interactions that can hold between the
linguistic expressions in a discourse and the discourse
structure. It includes examples of the devices that may be used
to mark overtly the boundaries between discourse segments--
examples of the use of aspect, mood, and particular "cue"
phrases--as well as of the use of referring expressions that are
affected by discourse segment boundaries.
The use of cue phrases to indicate discourse boundaries is
illustrated in utterances (9) and (11); in (9) the phrase "in the
first place" marks the beginning of DS5 while in (11) "moreover"
ends DS5 and marks the start of DS6. These phrases also carry
information about the intentional structure, namely, that DSP5
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and DSP6 are dominated by DSP4. In some cases, cue phrases have
multiple functions; they convey propositional content as well as
marking discourse segment boundaries. The "but" in utterance (7)
is an example of such a multiple function use.
The boundaries between DS1 and DS2, DS4 and DS5, and DS4 and
DS2 reflect changes of aspect and mood. The switch from
declarative, present tense to interrogative modal aspect does not
in itself seem to signal the boundary (for recognition purposes)
in this discourse unambiguously, but it does indicate a possible
line of demarcation which, in fact, is valid.
The effect of segmentation on referring expressions is shown
by the use of the generic noun phrase "a. moving picture show" in
(4). Although a reference to the movies was made with a pronoun
("their") in (3), a full definite noun phrase is used in (4).
This use reflects and perhaps in part marks the boundary between
the segments DS1 and DS2.
Finally, this discourse has an example of the trade-off
between explicitly marking a discourse boundary, and recognizing
it, as well as the relationship between the associated DSPs, by
reasoning about the intentions themselves. There is no overt
linguistic marker of the beginning of DS7; its separation must be
inferred from DSP7 and its relationship to DSP6.
3.2 A Task-Oriented Dialogue
The second example is a fragment of a task-oriented dialogue
taken from Grosz (1981); it is from the same corpus that was used
by her (Grosz, 1974). Figure 3-4 contains the dialogue fragment
and indicates the boundaries for its main segments.7 Figure 3-5
DS1 (1) E. First you have to remove the flywheel.
(2) A: How do I remove the flywheel?
(3) E: First, loosen the two allen head setscrews
holding it to the shaft, then pull it off.
(4) A: OK.
I
Figure 3-': A Segment of a Task-Oriented Dialogue
DS2 (5) I can only find one screw. Where's the other one?
(6) E: On the hub of the flywheel.
(7) A: That's the one I found. Where's the other one?
(8) E: About ninety degrees around the hub from the first one.
(9) A: I don't understand. I can only find one. Oh
wait, yes I think I was on the wrong wheel.
(10) E: Show me what you are doing.
(11) A: I was on the wrong wheel and I can find
I them both now.
DS3 (12) The tool I have is awkward. Is there another
tool that I could use instead?
(13) E: Show me the tool you are using.
(14) A: OK.
(15) E: Are you sure you are using the right size
key?
(16) A: I'll try some others.
_ (17) 1 found an angle I can get at it.
DS4 (18) The two screws are loose, but I'm having trouble
getting the wheel off.
DS5 (19) E: Use the wheelpuller- Do you know how to use
it?
(20) A: No.
(21) E: Do you know what it looks like?
(22) A: Yes.
(23) E: Show it to me please.
(24) A: OK.
(25) E: Good, Loosen the screw in the center and
place the jaws around the hub of the
wheel, then tighten the screw onto the
center of the shaft. The wheel should
slide off.
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Primary Intentions:
Il: (Intend Expert (Intend Apprentice (Remove A flywheel)))
12: (Intend A (Intend E (Tell E A (Location other setscrew))))
13: (Intend A (Intend E (Identify E A another tool)))
14: (Intend A (Intend E (Tell E A (How (Getoff A wheel)))))
15: (Intend E (Know-How-to A (Use A wheelpuller)))
Dominance Relationships:
Il DOM 12
II DOM 13
II DOM 14
14 DOM 15
Satisfaction-Precedence Relationships:
12 SP 13
12 SP 14
13 SP 14
Figure 3-5: Intentional Structure fcr the Task-Oriented Dialogue
Segment
gives the primary component of the DSPs for this fragment and
shows the dominance relationships between them.
In contrast with the movies essay, the primary components of
the DSPs in this dialogue are mostly intentions of the segment's
ICP that the OCP intend to perform some action. Also, unlike the
essay, the dialogue has two agents initiating the different
discourse segments. In this particular segment, the expert is
the ICP of DS1 and DS5, while the apprentice is the ICP of DS2-4.
To furnish a complete account of the intentional structure of
this discourse, one must be able to say how the satisfaction of
one agent's intentions can contribute to satisfying the
intentions of another agent. Such an account is beyond the scope
of this paper, but in Section 7 we discuss some of the
complexities involved in providing one (as well as its role
in discourse theory).
For the purposes of discussing this example, though, we need
to postulate two properties of the relationships among the
participants' intentions. These properties seem to be rooted in
features of cooperative behavior and depend on the two
participants' sharing some particular knowledge of the task.
First, it is a shared belief that, unless he states otherwise,
the OCP will adopt the intention to perform an action that the
ICP intended him to. Second, in adopting the intention to carry
out that action, the OCP also intends to. perform subactions that
are necessary. Thus, once the apprentice intends to remove the
flywheel, he also commits himself to the collateral intentions of
loosening the setscrews and pulling the wheel off. Note,
however, that not all the subactions need to be introduced
explicitly into the discourse. The apprentice may do several
actions that are never mentioned, and the expert may assume that
these are being undertaken on the basis of other information that
the apprentice obtains. The partiality of the intentional
structure stems to some extent from these characteristics of
intentions and actions.
As in the movies essay, some of the DSPs for this dialogue
are expressed directly in utterances. For instance, utterances
(1), (5), and (12) directly express the primary components of
DSPI, DSP2 and DSP3, respectively. The primary component of DSP4
is a derived intention. The surface intention of "but I'm having
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trouble getting the wheel off" is that the apprentice intends the
expert to believe that the apprentice is having trouble taking
off the flywheel. 14 is derived from the utterance and its
surface intention, as well as from features of discourse,
conventions about what intentions are associated with the "I am
having trouble doing X" type of utterance, and what the ICP and
OCP know about the task they have undertaken.
The dominance relationship that holds between Il and 12, as
well as the one that holds between Il and 13, may seem
problematic at first glance. It is not clear how locating any
single setscrew contributes to removing the flywheel. It is even
less clear how, in and of itself, identifying another tool does.
Two facts provide the link: first, that the apprentice (the OCP
of DS1) has taken on the task of removing the flywheel; second,
that the apprentice and expert share certain knowledge about the
task. Some of this shared task knowledge comes from the
discourse per se [e.g., utterance (3)], but some of it comes from
general knowledge, perceptual information, and the like. Thus, a
combination of information is relevant to determining 12 and 13
and their relationships to II, including all of the following:
the fact that II is part of the intentional structure, the fact
that the apprentice is currently working on satisfying II, the
utterance-level intentions of utterances (5) and (12), and
general knowledge about the task.
The satisfaction-precedence relations among 12, 13, and 14
are not communicated directly in the dialogue, but, like
dominance relations, depend on domain knowledge. One piece of
relevant knowledge is that a satisfaction-precedence relation
exists between loosening the setscrews and pulling off the
flywheel. That relation is shared knowledge that is stated
directly ("First loosen .... then pull"). The relation, along
with the fact that both 12 and 13 contribute to loosening the
setscrews, and that 14 contributes to pulling off the flywheel,
makes it possible to conclude 13 SP 14 and 12 SP 14. To conclude
that 12 SP 13, the apprentice must employ knowledge of how to go
about loosening screw-like objects.
The dominance and satisfaction-precedence relations for this
task-oriented fragment form a tree of intentions rather than just
a partial ordering. In general, however, for any fragment, task-
oriented or otherwise, this is not necessary.
It is essential to notice that the intentional structure is
neither identical to nor isomorphic to a general plan for
removing the flywheel. It is not identical because a plan
encompasses more than a collection of intentions and
relationships between them (compare Pollack's critique of AI
planning formalisms as the basis for inferring intentions in
discourse; Pollack, 1986). It is not isomorphic because the
intentional structure has a different substructure from the
general plan for removing the flywheel. In addition to the
intentions arising from steps in the plan, the intentional
structure typically contains DSPs corresponding to intentions
generated by the particular execution of the task and the
dialogue. For example, the general plan for the disassembly of a
flywheel includes subplans for loosening the setscrews and
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pulling off the wheel; it might also include subplans (of the
loosening step) for finding the setscrews, finding a tool with
which to loosen the screws, and loosening each screw
individually. However, this plan would not contain contingency
subplans for what to do when one cannot find the screws or realizes
that the available tool is unsatisfactory. Intentions 12 and 13
stem from difficulties encountered in locating and loosening the
setscrews. Thus, the intentional structure for this fragment is
not isomorphic to the general plan for removing the flywheel.
Utterance (18) offers another example of the difference
between the intentional structure and a general plan for the
task. This utterance is part of DS4--not just part of DSl--even
though it contains references to more than one single part of the
overall task (which is what II is about). It functions to
establish a new DSP, 14, as most salient. Rather than being
regarded as a report on the overall status of the task, the first
clause is best seen as modifying the DSP.8 With it, the
apprentice tells the expert that the trouble in removing the
wheel is not with the screws. Thus, although general task
knowledge is used in determining the intentional structure, it is
not identical to it.
In this dialogue, there are fewer instances in which cue
phrases are employed to indicate segment boundries than occur in
the movies essay. The primary example is the use of "first" in
(1) to mark the start of the segment and to indicate that its DSP
is the first of several intentions whose satisfaction will
contribute to satisfying the larger discourse of which they are a
part.
The dialogue includes a clear example of the influence of
discourse structure on referring expressions. The phrase "the
screw in the center" is used in (25) to refer to the center screw
of the wheelpuller, not one of the two setscrews mentioned in
(18). This use of the phrase is possible because of the
attentional state of the discourse structure at the time the
phrase is uttered.
4. Processing Issues
In previous sections of the paper, we abstracted from the
cognitive states of the discourse participants. The various
components of discourse structure discussed so far are properties
of the discourse itself, not of the discourse participants. To
use the theory in constructing computational models requires
determining how each of the individual components projects onto
the model of an individual discourse participant. In this
regard, the principal issues include specifying (1) how the ICP
indicates and the OCP recognizes the beginning and end of a
discourse segment, (2) how the OCP recognizes the discourse
segment purposes, and (3) how the focus space stack operates.
In essence, the OCP must judge for each utterance whether it
starts a new segment, ends the current one (and possibly some of
its embedding segments), or contributes to the current one. The
information available to the OCP for recognizing that an
utterance starts a new segment includes any explicit linguistic
cues contained in the utterance (see Section 69) as well as the
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relationship between its utterance-level intentions and the
active DSPs (i.e., those in some focus space that is still on the
stack). Likewise, the fact that an utterance ends a segment may
be indicated explicitly by linguistic cues or implicitly from its
utterance-level intentions and their relationship to elements of
the intentional structure. If neither of these is the case, the
utterance is part of the current segment. Thus, intention
recognition and focus space management play key roles in
processing. Moreover, they are also related: The intentional
structure is a primary factor in determining focus space changes,
and the focus space structure helps constrain the intention
recognition process.
4.1. Intention Recognition
The recognition of DP/DSPs is the central issue in the
computational modeling of intentional structure. If, as we have
claimed, for the discourse to be coherent and comprehensible, the
OCP must be able to recognize both the DP/DSPs 1 0 and
relationships (dominance and satisfaction-precedence) between
them, then the question of how the OCP does so is a crucial
issue.
For the discourse as a whole, as well as for each of its
segments, the OCP must identify both the intention that serves as
the discourse segment purpose and its relationship to other
discourse-level intentions. In particular, the OCP must be able
to recognize which other DSPs that specific intention dominates
and is dominated by, and, where relevant, with which other DSPs
it has satisfaction-precedence relationships. Two issues that
are central to the recognition problem are what information the
OCP can utilize in effecting the recognition and at what point in
the discourse that information becomes available.
An adequate computational model of the recognition process
depends critically on an adequate theory of intention and action;
this, of course, is a large research problem in itself and one
not restricted to matters of discourse. The need to use such a
model for discourse, however, adds certain constraints on the
adequacy of any theory or model. Pollack (1986) describes
several properties such theories and models must possess if they
are to be adequate for supporting recognition of intention in
single-utterance queries; she shows how .current AI planning
models are inadequate and proposes an alternative planning
formalism. The need to enable recognition of discourse-level
intentions leads t3 yet another set of requirements.
As will become clear in what follows, the information
available to the OCP comes from a variety of sources. Each of
these can typically provide partial information about the DSPs
and their relationships. These sources are each partially
constraining, but only in their ensemble do they constrain in
full. To the extent that more information is furnished by any
one source, commensurately less is needed from the others. The
overall processing model must be one of constraint satisfaction
that can operate on partial information. It must allow for
incrementally constraining the range of possibilities on the
basis of new information that becomes available as the segment
progresses.
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4.1.1. Information constraining the DSP. At least three
different kinds of information play a role in the determination
of the DSP: specific linguistic markers, utterance-level
intentions, and general knowledge about actions and objects in
the domain of discourse. Each plays a part in the OCP's
recognition of the DSP and can be utilized by the ICP to
facilitate this recognition.
Cue phrases are the most distinguished linguistic means that
speakers have for indicating discourse segment boundaries and
conveying information about the DSP. Recent evidence by
Hirschberg and Pierrehumbert (1986) suggests that certain
intonational properties of utterances also provide partial
information about the DSP relationships. Because some cue
phrases may be used as clausal connectors, there is a need to
distinguish their discourse use from their use in conveying
propositional content at the utterance level. For example, the
word "but" functions as a boundary marker in utterance (7) of the
discourse in Section 3.1, but it can also be used solely (as in
the current utterance) to convey propositional content (e.g., the
conjunction of two propositions) and serve to connect two clauses
within a segment.
As discussed in Section 6, cue phrases can provide
information about dominance and satisfaction-precedence
relationships between segments' DSPs. However, they may not
completely specify which DSP dominates or satisfaction-precedes
the DSP of the segment they start. Furthermore, cue phrases that
explicitly convey information only about the attentional
structure (see Section 6) may be ambiguous about the state to
which attention is to shift. For example, if there have been
several interruptions (see Section 5), the phrase "but anyway"
indicates a return to some previously interrupted discourse, but
does not specify which one. Although cue phrases do not
completely specify a DSP, the information they provide is useful
in limiting the options to be considered.
The second kind of information the OCP has available is the
utterance-level intention of each utterance in the discourse. As
the discussion of the movies example (Section 3.1) pointed out,
the DSP may be identical to the utterance-level intention of some
utterance in the segment. Alternatively, the DSP may combine
the intentions of several utterances, as is illustrated in the
following discourse segment:
I want you to arrange a trip for me to Palo Alto.
It will be for two weeks.
I only fly on TWA.
The DSP for this segment is, roughly, that the ICP intends
for the OCP to make (complete) trip arrangements for the ICP to
go to Palo Alto for two weeks, under the constraint that any
flights be on TWA. The Gricean intentions for these three
utterances are as follows:
Utterance 1: ICP intends that OCP believe that ICP intends that
OCP intend to make trip plans for ICP to go
to Palo Alto
Utterance 2: ICP intends that OCP believe that ICP intends
OCP to believe that the trip will last two weeks
Utterance 3: ICP intends that OCP believe that ICP intends
OCP to believe that ICP flies only on TWA
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These intentions must be combined in some way to produce the
DSP. The process is quite complex, since the OCP must recognize
that the reason for utterances 2 and 3 is not simply to have some
new beliefs about the ICP, but to use those beliefs in arranging
the trip. While this example fits the schema of a request
followed by two informings, schemata will not suffice to
represent the behavior as a general rule. A different sequence
of utterances with different utterance-level intentions can have
the same DSP; this is the case in the following segment:
Sl: Have I told you yet to arrange my trip to
Palo Alto? Remember that I will fly
only on TWA. OK?
S2: OK.
S3: I'm planning on staying for two weeks.
It is possible for a sequence that consists of a request
followed by two informings not to result in a modification of the
trip plans. For example, in the following sequence the third
utterance results in changing the way the arrangements are made,
rather than constraining the nature of the arrangements
themselves.
I want you to arrange a two-week trip for me to Palo Alto.
I fly only on TWA.
The rates go up tomorrow, so you'll want to call today.
Not only is the contribution of utterance-level intentions
to DSPs complicated, but in some instances the DSP for a segment
may both constrain and be partially determined by the Gricean
intention for some utterance in the segment. For example, the
Gricean-intention for utterance (15) in the movies example
(Section 3.1) is derived from a combination of facts about the
utterance itself, and from its place in the discourse. On the
surface, (15) appears to be a question addressed to the OCP; its
intention would be roughly that the ICP intends the OCP to
believe that the ICP wants to know how young people, etc. But
(15) is actually a rhetorical question and has a very different
intention associated with it--namely, that the ICP intends the
OCP to believe proposition P2 (namely, that young people cannot
drink in through their eyes a continuous spectacle of intense and
strained activity without harmful effects). In this example,
this particular intention is also the primary component of the
DSP.
The third kind of information that plays a role in
determining the DP/DSPs is shared knowledge about actions and
objects in the domain of discourse. This shared knowledge is
especially important when the linguistic markers and utterance-
level intentions are insufficient for determining the DSP
precisely.
In Section 7 we introduce two relations, a supports relation
between propositions and a generates relation between actions,
and present two rules stating equivalences; one links a dominance
relation between two DSPs with a supports relation between
propositions and the other links a dominance relation between
DSPs to a generates relation between actions. Use of these rules
in one direction allows for (partially) determining what supports
or generates relationship holds from the dominance relationship.
But the rules can be used in the opposite direction also: If,
from the content of utterances and reasoning about the domain of
discourse, a supports or generates relationship can be
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determined, then the dominates relationship between DSPs can be
determined. In such cases it is important to derive the
dominance relationship so that the appropriate intentional and
attentional structures are available for processing or
determining the interpretation of the subsequent discourse.
From the perspective of recognition, a tradeoff implicit in
the two equivalences is important. If the ICP makes the dominance
relationship between two DSPs explicit (e.g., with cue phrases),
then the OCP can use this information to help recognize the
(ICP's beliefs about the) supports relationship. Conversely, if
the ICP's utterances make clear the (ICP's beliefs about the)
supports or generates relationship, then the OCP can use this
information to help recognize the dominance relationship.
Although it is most helpful to use the dominance relationships to
constrain the search for appropriate supports and generates
relationships, sometimes these latter relationships can be
inferred reasonably directly from the utterances in a segment
using general knowledge about the objects and actions in the
domain of discourse. It remains an open question what inferences
are needed and how complex it will be to compute supports and
generates relationships if the dominance relationship is not
directly indicated in a discourse.
Utterances from the movies essay illustrate this tradeoff.
In utterance (9), the phrase "in the first place" expresses the
dominance relationship between DSPs of the new segment DS5 and
the parent segment DS4 directly. Because of the dominance
relationship (as well as the intentions expressed in the
utterances), the OCP can determine that the ICP believes that the
proposition that the content of the plays is not the best
provides support for the proposition that the result of
indiscriminate movie going is harmful. Hence determining
dominance yields the support relation. The support relation can
also yield dominance. Utterances (12)-14), which comprise DS7,
are not explicitly marked for a dominance relation. It can be
inferred from the fact that the propositions in (12)-(14) provide
support for the proposition embedded in DSP6 (that is, that the
stories in movies are exciting and over-emotional) that DSP6
dominates DSP7.
Finally, the more information an ICP supplies explicitly in
the actual utterances of a discourse, the less reasoning about
domain information an OCP has to do to achieve recognition.
Cohen (1983) has made a similar claim regarding the problem of
recognizing the relationship between one proposition and another.
4.1.2. When is the intention recognized? As discussed in
Section 2.2, the intentional structure evolves as the discourse
does. By the same token, the discourse participants' mental-
state correlates of the intentional structure are not prebuilt;
neither participant may have a complete model of the intentional
structure "in mind" until the discourse is completed. The
dominance relationships that actually shape the intentional
structure cannot be known a priori, because the specific
intentions that will come into play are not known (never by the
OCP, hardly ever by the ICP) until the utterances in the
discourse have been made. Although it is assumed that the
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participants' common knowledge includes 1 1 enough information
about the domain to determine various relationships such as
supports and generates, it is not assumed that, prior to a
discourse, they actually had inferred and are aware of all the
relationships they will need for that discourse.
Because any of the utterances in a segment may contribute
information relevant to a complete determination of the DSP, the
recognition process is not complete until the end of the segment.
However, the OCP must be able to recognize at least a
generalization of the DSP so that he can make the proper moves
with respect to the attentional structure. That is, some
combination of explicit indicators and intentional and
propositional content must allow the OCP to ascertain where the
DSP will fit in the intentional structure at the begining of a
segment, even if the specific intention that is the DSP cannot be
determined until the end of the segment.
Utterance (15) in the movies example illustrates this point.
The author writes, "How can our young people drink in through
their eyes a continuous spectacle of intense and strained
activity and feeling without harmful effects?" The primary
intention 12 is derived from this utterance, but this cannot be
done until very late in the discourse segment [since (15) occurs
at the end of DS2]. Furthermore, the segment for which 12 is
primary has complex embedding of other segments. Utterance (16),
intention 10, and DSO constitute another example of the
expression of a primary intention late in a discourse segment.
In that case, 10 cannot be computed until (16) has been read, and
(16) is not only the last utterance in DSO, but is one that
covers the entire essay. If an OCP must recognize a DSP to
understand a segment, then we ask: How does the OCP recognize a
DSP when the utterance from which its primary intention is
derived comes so late in the segment?
We conjecture with regard to such segments as D2 of the
movies essay that the primary intention (e.g., 12) may be
determined partially (and hence a generalized version become
recognizable) before the point at which it is actually expressed
in the discourse. While the DP/DSP may not be expressed early,
there is still partial information about it. This partial
information often suffices to establish dominance (or
satisfaction-precedence) relationships for additional segments.
As these latter are placed in the hierarchy, their DSPs can
provide further partial information for th' underspecified DSP.
For example, even though the intention 10 is expressed directly
only in the last utterance of the movies essay, utterance (4)
expresses an intention to know whether p or vp is true (i.e.,
whether or not parents should let children see movies often and
without close monitoring). 10 is an intention to believe, whose
proposition is a generalization of the <sp expressed in (4).
Consider also the primary intention 14. It occurs in a segment
embedded within DS2, is more general than 12, but is an
approximation to it. It would not be surprising to discover that
OCPs can in fact predict something close to 12 on the basis of
14, utterances (9)-(14), and the partial dominance hierarchy
available at each point in the discourse.
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4.2. Use of the Attentional State Model
The focus space structure enables certain processing
decisions to be made locally. In particular, it limits the
information that must be considered in recognizing the DSP as
well as that considered in identifying the referents of certain
classes of definite noun phrases.
A primary role of the focus space stack is to constrain the
range of DSPs considered as candidates for domination or
satisfaction-precedence of the DSP of the current segment. Only
those DSPs in some space on the focusing stack are viable
prospects. As a result of this use of the focusing structure,
the theory predicts that this decision will be a local one with
respect to attentional state. Because two focus spaces may be
close to each other in the attentional structure without the
discourse segments they arise from necessarily being close to one
another and vice versa, this prediction corresponds to a claim
that locality in the focusing structure is what matters to
determination of the intentional structure.
A second role of the focusing structure is to constrain the
OCP's search for possible referents of definite noun phrases and
pronouns. To illustrate this role, we will consider the phrase
"the screw in the center" in utterance (25) of the task-oriented
dialogue of Section 3. The focus stack configuration when
utterance (25) is spoken is shown in Figure 4-1. The stack
contains (in bottom-to-top order) focus spaces FS1, FS4, and FS5
for segments DS1, DS4, and DS5, respectively. For DS5 the
wheelpuller is a focused entity, while for DS4 the two setscrews
SCREW1
SCREW2
DSP
2 FS2
SETSCREWS
3
FLYWHEEL
1 0
DSP1
FS1
ALLEN WRENCH,
KEYS
1 4
DSP3 •
FS3
SETSCREWS
3
FLYWHEEL
10
DSP 
1 FS1
WHEELPULLER
8
DSP
5
FS5
SETSCREWS
3
FLYWHEEL
1 0
DSP
4 FS4
SETSCREWS
3
FLYWHEEL
1 0
DSP
1 FS1
time
FIGURE '-1 FOCUS STACK TRANSITIONS LEADING UP TO UTTERANCE (25)
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are (because they are explicitly mentioned). The entities in FS5
are considered before those in FS4 as potential referents. The
wheelpuller has three screws: two small screws fasten the side
arms, and a large screw in the center is the main functioning
part. As a result, this large screw is implicitly in focus in
FS5 (Grosz, 1977) and thus identified as the referent without the
two setscrews ever being considered.
Attentional state also constrains the search for referents
of pronouns. Because pronouns contain less explicit information
about their referents than definite descriptions, additional
mechanisms are needed to account for what may and may not be
pronominalized in the discourse. One such mechanism is centering
(which we previously called immediate focusing) (Grosz, Joshi, &
Weinstein, 1983; Sidner, 1979).
Centering, like focusing, is a dynamic behavior, but is a
more local phenomenon. In brief, a backward-looking center is
associated with each utterance in a discourse segment; of all the
focused elements the backward-looking center is the one that is
central in that utterance (i.e., the uttering of the particular
sequence of words at that point in the discourse). A combination
of syntactic, semantic, and discourse information are used to
identify the backward-looking center. The fact that some entity
is the backward-looking center is used to constrain the search
for the referent of a pronoun in a subsequent utterance. Note
that unlike the DSP, which is constant for a segment, the
backward-looking center may shift: different entities may become
more salient at different points in the segment.
The presence of both centers and DSPs in this theory leads
us to an intriguing conjecture: that "topic" is a concept that
is used ambiguously for both the DSP of a segment and the center.
In the literature the concept of "topic" has appeared in many
guises. In syntactic form it is used to describe the preposing
of syntactic constitutents in English and the "wa" marking in
Japanese. Researchers have used it to describe the sentence
topic (i.e., what the sentence is about Firbas, 1971; Sgall,
Hajicova, & Benesova, 1973; & Hajicova, 1983), and as a pragmatic
notion (Reinhart, 1981); others want to use the term for
"discourse topic" either to mean what the discourse is about, or
to be defined as those propositions(s) the ICP provides or
requests new information about (see Reinhart, 1981, for a review
of many of the notions of aboutness and topic). It appears that
many of the descriptions of sentence topic correspond (though not
always) to centers, while discourse topic corresponds to the DSP
of a segment or of the discourse.
5. Application of the Theory: Interruptions
Interruptions in discourses pose an important test of any
theory of discourse structure. Because processing an utterance
requires ascertaining how it fits with previous discourse, it is
crucial to decide which parts of the previous discourse are
relevant to it, and which cannot be. Interruptions, by
definition, do not fit; consequently their treatment as
implications for the treatment of the normal flow of discourse.
Interruptions may take many forms--some are not at all relevant
to the content and flow of the interrupted discourse, others are
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quite relevant, and many fall somewhere in between these
extremes. A theory must differentiate these cases and explain
(among other things) what connections exist between the main
discourse and the interruption, and how the relationship between
them affects the processing of the utterances in both.
The importance of distinguishing between intentional
structure and attentional state is evident in the three examples
considered in Subsections 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4. The distinction
also permits us to explain a type of behavior deemed by others to
be similar--so-called semantic returns--an issue we examine in
Subsection 5.5.
These examples do not exhaust the types of interruptions
that can occur in discourse. There are other ways to vary the
explicit linguistic (and nonlinguistic) indicators used to
indicate boundaries, the relationships between DSPs, and the
combinations of focus space relationships present. However, the
examples provide illustrations of interruptions at different
points along the spectrum of relevancy to the main discourse.
Because they can be explained more adequately by the theory of
discourse structure presented here than by previous theories,
they support the importance of the disctinctions we have drawn.
5.1 Preliminary Definitions
From an intuitive view, we observe that interruptions are
pieces of discourse that break the flow of the preceding
discourse. An interruption is in some way distinct from the rest
of the preceding discourse; after the break for the interruption,
the discourse returns to the interrupted piece of discourse. In
the example below, from Polanyi and Scha (1986), there are two
(separate) discourses, Dl indicated in normal type (without
underscore), and D2 underscored italics. D2 is an interruption
that breaks the flow of D1 and is distinct from Dl.
Dl: John came by
and left the groceries
D2: Stop that
you kids
Dl: and I put them away
after he left
Using the theory described in previous sections, we can
capture the above intuitions about the nature of interruptions
with two slightly different definitions. The strong definition
holds for those interruptions we classify as "true interruptions"
and digressions, while the weaker form holds for those that are
flashbacks. The two definitions are as follows:
Strong definition: An interruption is a discourse segment
whose DSP is not dominated nor satisfaction-preceded by the DSP
of any preceding segment.
Weak definition: An interruption is a discourse segment
whose DSP is not dominated nor satisfaction-preceded by the DSP
of the immediately preceding segment.
Neither of the above definitions includes an explicit
mention of our intuition that there is a "return" to the
interrupted discourse after an interruption. The return is an
effect of the normal progress of a conversation. If we assume a
focus space is normally popped from the focus stack if and only
if a speaker has satisfied the DSP of its corresponding segment,
then it naturally follows both that the focus space for the
interruption will be popped after the interruption, and that the
focus space for the interrupted segment will be at the top of the
stack because its DSP is yet to be satisfied.
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There are other kinds of discourse segments that one may
want to consider in light of the interruption continuum and these
definitions. Clarification dialogues (Allen, 1979) and debugging
explanations (Sidner, 1983) are two such possibilities. Both of
them, unlike the interruptions discussed here, share a DSP with
their preceding segment and thus do not conform to our definition
of interruption. These kinds of discourses may constitute
another general class of discourse segments that, like
interruptions, can be abstractly defined.
5.2. Type 1: True Interruptions
The first kind of interruption is the true interruption,
which follows the strong definition of interruptions. It is
exemplified by the interruption given in the previous subsection.
Discourses Dl and D2 have distinct, unrelated purposes and convey
different information about properties, objects, and relations.
Since D2 occurs within D1, one expects the discourse structures
for the two segments to be somehow embedded as well. The theory
described in this paper differs from Polanyi and Scha's (1984)
(and other more radically different proposals as well; e.g.,
Linde, & Goguen, 1978; Cohen, 1983; and Reichman, 1984) because the
"embedding" occurs only in the attentional structure. As shown
in Figure 5-1, the focus space for D2 is pushed onto the stack
above the focus space for Dl, so that the focus space for D2 is
more salient than the one for Dl, until D2 is completed. The
intentional structures for the two segments are distinct. There
are two DP/DSP structures for the utterances in this sequence--
one for those in Dl and the other for those in D2. It is not
DISCOURCE SEGMENTS FOCUS SPACE STACK
KIDS 1
KIDS, STOP...
Dl: JOHN CAME BY AND /
LEFT THE GROCERIES / 2
1 FS5
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Dl cont: AND I PUT THEM \ JOHN 10
AWAY AFTER HE LEFT GROCERIES14
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DSP FS4
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^________________\
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FIGURE 5-1 THE STRUCTURES OF A TRUE INTERRUPTION
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necessary to relate these two; indeed, from an intuitive point of
view, they are not related.
The focusing structure for true interruptions is different
from that for the normal embedding of segments, because the
focusing boundary between the interrupted discourse and the
interruption is impenetrable. 1 2 (This is depicted in the figure
by a line with intersecting hash marks between focus spaces).
The impenetrable boundary between the focus spaces prevents
entities in the spaces below the boundary from being available to
the spaces above it. Because the second discourse shifts
attention totally to a new purpose (and may also shift the
identity of the intended hearers), the speaker cannot use any
referential expressions during it that depend on the
accessibility of entities from the first discourse. Since the
boundary between the focus space for Dl and the one for D2 is
impenetrable, if D2 were to include an utterance such as "put
them away," the pronoun would have to refer deictically, and not
anaphorically, to the groceries.
In this sample discourse, however, Dl is resumed almost
immediately. The pronoun "them" in "and I put them away" cannot
refer to the children1 3 (the focus space for D2 has been popped
from the stack), but only to the groceries. For this to be clear
to the OCP, the ICP must indicate a return to D1 explicitly. One
linguistic indicator in this example is the change of mood from
imperative. Indicators that the "stop that" utterance is an
interruption include the change to imperative mood and the use of
the vocative (Polanyi & Scha, 1983). Two other indicators may be
assumed to have been present at the time of the discourse--a
change of intonation (imagine a slightly shrill tone of command
with an undercurrent of annoyance) and a shift of gaze (toward
and then away from the kids). It is also possible that the type
of pause present in such cases is evidence of the interruption,
but further research is needed to establish whether this is
indeed the case.
In contrast to previous accounts, we are not forced to
integrate these two discourses into a single grammatical
structure, or to answer questions about the specific relationship
between segments D2 and Dl, as in Reichman's model (Reichman,
1984). Instead, the intuition that readers have of an embedding
in the discourse structure is captured in the attentional state
by the stacking of focus spaces. In addition, a reader's
intuitive impression of the distinctness of the two segments is
captured in their different intentional (DP/DSP) structures.
5.3. Type 2: Flashbacks and Filling in Missing Pieces
Sometimes an ICP interrupts the flow of discussion because
some purposes, propositions, or entities need to be brought into
the discourse but have not been: The ICP forgot to include those
entities first, and so must now go back and fill in the missing
information. A flashback segment occurs at that point in the
discourse. The flashback is defined as a segment whose DSP
satisfaction-precedes the interrupted segment and is dominated by
some other segment's DSP. Hence, it is a specialization of the
weak definition of interruptions. This type of interruption
differs from true interruptions both intentionally and
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linguistically: The DSP for the flashback bears some
relationship to the DP for the whole discourse. The linguistic
indicator of the flashback typically includes a comment about
something going wrong. In addition the audience always remains
the same, whereas it may change for a true interruption (as in
the example of the previous section).
In the example below, taken from Sidner (1982), the ICP is
instructing a mock-up system (mimicked by a person) about how to
define and display certain information in a particular knowledge-
representation language. Again the interruption is indicated by
underscoring.
OK. Now how do I say that Bill is.
Whoops 1 forgot about ABC.
I need an individual concept for the company ABC
...[remainder of discourse segment on ABC] ...
Now back to Bill. How do I say that Bill is an employee
of ABC?
The DP for the larger discourse from which this sequence was
taken is to provide information about various companies
(including ABC) and their employees. The outer segment in this
example--DBill--has a DSP--DSPBill--to tell about Bill, while the
inner segment--DABC--has a DSP--DSPABC--to convey certain
information about ABC. Because of the nature of the information
being told, there is order in the final structure of the DP/DSPs:
Information about ABC must be conveyed before all of the
information about Bill can be. The ICP in this instance does not
realize this constraint until after he begins. The "flashback"
interruption allows him to satisfy DSPABC while suspending
satisfaction of DSPBill (which he then resumes). Hence, there is
an intentional structure rooted at DP and with DSPABC and DSPBill
as ordered sister nodes. The following three relationships hold
between the different DSPs: 14
DP DOM DSPABC
DP DOM DSPBill
DSPABC SP DSPBill
This kind of interruption is distinct from a true
interruption because there is a connection, although indirect,
between the DSPs for the two segments. Furthermore, the
linguistic features of the start of the interruption signify that
there is a precedence relation betwen these DSPs (and hence that
the correction is necessary). Flashbacks are also distinct from
normally embedded discourses because of the precedence
relationship between the DSPs for the two segments and the order
in which the segments occur.
The available linguistic data permit three possible
attentional states as appropriate models for flashback-type
interruptions: one is identical to the state that would ensue if
the flashback segment were a normally embedded segment, the
second resembles the model of a true interruption, and the third
differs from the others by requiring an auxiliary stack. An
example of the stack for a normally embedded sequence is given in
Section 4.2.
Figure 5-2 illustrates the last possibility. The focus
space for the flashback--FSABC--is pushed onto the stack after an
appropriate number of spaces, including the focus space for the
outer segment--FSBill, have been popped from the main stack and
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FIGURE 5-2 THE AUXILIARY-STACK MODEL FOR FLASHBACKS
pushed onto an auxiliary stack. All of the entities in the focus
spaces remaining on the main stack are normally accessible
for reference, but none of those on the auxiliary stack are. In
the example in the figure, entities in the spaces from FSA to FSB
are accessible as well (though less salient than) those in space
FSAB C. Evidence for this kind of stack behavior could come from
discourses in which phrases in the segment about ABC could refer
to entities represented in FSB, but not to those in FSBill or
FSC . After an explicit indication that there is a return to
DSPBill (e.g., the "Now back to Bill" used in this example), any
focus spaces left on the stack from the flashback are popped off,
and all spaces on the auxiliary stack (including FSBill) are
returned to the main stack. Note, however, that this model does
not preclude the possibility of a return to some space between
FSA and FSC before popping the auxiliary stack. Whether there
are discourses which include such a return and are deemed
coherent is an open question.
The auxiliary stack model differs from the other two models
by the references permitted and by the spaces that can be popped
to. Given the initial configuration in Figure 5-2, if the
segment with DSPABC were normally embedded, FSABC would just
be added to the top of the stack. If it were a true interruption,
the space would also be added to the stack, but with an
impenetrable boundary between it and FSBill. In the normal stack
model, entities in the spaces lower in the stack would be
accessible; in the true interruption they would not. In either
of these two models, however, FSBill would be the space returned
Structure of Discourse - 62
to first. The auxiliary stack model is obviously more
complicated than the other two alternatives. Whether it (or some
equivalent alternative) is necessary depends on facts of
discourse behavior that have not yet been determined.
5.4. Type 3: Digressions
The third type of interruption, which we call a digression,
is defined as a strong interruption that contains a reference to
some entity that is salient in both the interruption and the
interrupted segment. For example, if while discussing Bill's
role in company ABC, one conversational participant interrupts
with, "Speaking of Bill, that reminds me, he came to dinner last
week," Bill remains salient, but the DP.changes. Digressions
commonly begin with phrases such as "speaking of John" or "that
reminds me," although no cue phrase need be present, and "that
reminds me" may also signal other stack and intention shifts.
In the processing of digressions, the discourse-level
intention of the digression forms the base of a separate
intentional structure, just as in the case of true interruptions.
A new focus space is formed and pushed onto the stack, but it
contains at least one--and possibly other--entities from the
interrupted segment's focus space. Like the flashback-type
interruption, the digression must usually be closed with an
explicit utterance such as "getting back to ABC..." or "anyway."
5.5. Noninterruptions--"Semantic Returns"
One case of discourse behavior that we must distinguish
comprises the co-called "semantic returns" observed by Reichman
(1981) and discussed by Polanyi and Scha (1983). In all the
interruptions we have considered so far, the stack must be popped
when the interruption is over and the interrupted discourse is
resumed. The focus space for the interrupted segment is
"returned to." In the case of semantic returns, entities and
DSPs that were salient during a discourse in the past are taken
up once again, but are explicitly reintroduced. For example,
suppose that yesterday two people discussed how badly Jack was
behaving at the party; then today one of them says "Remember our
discussion about Jack at the party? Well, a lot of other people
thought he acted just as badly as we thought he did." The
utterances today recall, or return to, yesterday's conversation
to help satisfy the intention that more.be said about Jack's poor
behavior.
Anything that can be talked about once can be talked about
again. However, if there is no focus space on the stack
corresponding to the segment and DSP being discussed further,
then, as Polanyi and Scha (1983) point out, there is no popping
of the stack. There need not be any discourse underway when a
semantic return occurs; in such cases, the focus stack will be
empty. Thus, unlike the returns that follow normal
interruptions, semantic returns involve a push onto the stack of
a new space containing, among other things, representations of
the reintroduced entities.
The separation of attentional state from intentional
structure makes clear not only what is occurring in such cases,
but also the intuitions underlying the term "semantic return."
In reintroducing some entities from a previous discourse,
Structure of Discourse - 63
Structure of Discourse - 64
conversational participants are establishing some connection
between the DSP of the new segment and the intentional structure
of the original discourse. It is not a return to a previous
focus space because the focus space for the original discourse is
gone from the stack, and the items to be referred to must be re-
established explicitly. For example, the initial reference to
Jack in the preceding example cannot be accomplished with a
pronoun; with no prior mention of Jack in the current discussion,
one cannot say, "Remember our discussion about him at the party."
The intuitive impression of a return in the strict sense is only
a return to a previous intentional structure.
6. Application of the Theory: Cue Words
Both attentional state and intentional structure change
during a discourse. ICPs rarely change attention by directly and
explicitly referring to attentional state (e.g., using the phrase
"Now let's turn our attention to..."). Likewise, discourses only
occasionally include an explicit reference to a change in purpose
(e.g., with an utterance such as "Now I want to explain the
theory of dynamic programming"). More typically, ICPs employ
indirect means of indicating that a change is coming and what
kind of change it is. Cue phrases provide abbreviated, indirect
means of indicating these changes.
In all discourse changes, the ICP must provide information
that allows the OCP to determine all of the following: (1) that
a change of attention is imminent; (2) whether the change returns
to a previous focus space or creates a new one; (3) how the
intention is related to other intentions; (4) what precedence
relationships, if any, are relevant; (5) what intention is
entering into focus. Cue phrases can pack in all of this
information, except for (5). In this section, we will explore
the predictions of our discourse structure theory about different
uses of these phrases and the explanations the theory offers for
their various roles.
We will use the configuration of attentional state and
intentional structure illustrated in Figure 6-1 as the starting
point of our analysis. In the initial configuration, the focus
space stack has a space with DSP X at the bottom and another
space with DSP A at the top. The intentional structure includes
the information that X dominates A. From this initial
configuration, a wide variety of moves may be made. We will
examine several changes and the cue phrases that can indicate each
of them. Because these phrases and words in isolation may
ambiguously play either discourse or other functional roles, we
will also discuss the other uses whenever appropriate.
Furthermore, cue phrases do not function unambiguously with
respect to a particular discourse role. Thus for example,
"first" can be used for two different moves that we discuss
below.
First, consider what happens when the ICP shifts to a new
DSP, B, that is dominated by A (and correspondingly by X). The
dominance relationship between A and B becomes part of the
intentional structure. In addition, the change in DSP results in
a change in the focus stack. The focus stack models this change,
which we will call new dominance, by A having new space pushed
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onto the stack with B as the DSP of that space (as illustrated in
Figure 6-2). The space containing A is salient, but less so than
the space with B. Cue phrase(s) to signal this case, and only
this one, must communicate two pieces of information: that there
is a change to some new purpose (resulting in a new focus space
being created in the attentional state model rather than a return
to one on the stack) and that the new purpose (DSP B) is
dominated by DSP A. Typical cue phrases for this kind of change
are "for example" and "to wit," and sometimes "first," and
DISCOURSE SEGMENTS FOCUS SPACE STACK DOMINANCE HIERARCHY "second."
ATTENTIONAL-STATE CHANGE DOMINANCE HIERARCHY
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FIGURE 6-1 AN INITIAL DISCOURSE-STRUCTURE CONFIGURATION
DSP = A
DSP =X
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Cue phrases can also exhibit the existence of a
satisfaction-precedence relationship. If B is to be the first in
a list of DSPs dominated by A, then words such as "first" and "in
the first place" can be used to communicate this fact. Later in
the discourse, cue phrases such as "second," "third," and
"finally" can be used to indicate DSPs that are dominated by A
and satisfaction-preceded by B. In these cases, the focus space
containing B would be popped from the stack and the new focus
space inserted above the one containing A.
There are three other kinds of discourse segments that
change the intentional structure with a resulting push of new
focus spaces onto the stack: The true-interruption, where B is
not dominated by A; the flashback, where B satisfaction-precedes
A; and the digression, where B is not dominated by A, but some
entity from the focus space containing A is carried over to the
new focus space.
One would expect that there might be cue phrases that would
distinguish among all four of these kinds of changes. Just that
is so. There are cue phrases that announce one and only one
kind of change. The cue phrases mentioned above for new
dominance are never used for the three kinds of discourse
interruption pushes. The cue phrases for true-interruptions
express the intention to interrupt (e.g., "Excuse me a minute,"
or "I must interrupt") while the distinct cue phrase for
flashbacks (e.g., "Oops, I forgot about ... ") indicates that
something is out of order. The typical opening cue phrases of
the digression mention the entity that is being carried forward
(e.g., "Speaking of John ... " or "Did you hear about John?").
Cue phrases can also exhibit the satisfaction of a DSP, and
hence the completion of a discourse segment. The completion of a
segment causes the current space to be popped from the stack.
There are many means of linguistically marking completions. In
texts, paragraph and chapter boundaries and explicit comments
(e.g., "The End") are common. In conversations, completion can
be indicated either with cue phrases such as "fine" or "OK"'15 or
with more explicit references to the satisfaction of the
intention (e.g., "That's all for point 2," or "The ayes have
it.").
Most cue phrases that communicate changes to attentional
state announce pops of the focus stack. However, at least one
cue phrase can be construed to indicate a push, namely, "That
reminds me." By itself, this phrase does not specify any
particular change in intentional structure, but merely shows that
there will be a new DSP. Since this is equivalent to indicating
that a new focus space is to be pushed onto the stack, this cue
phrase is best seen as conveying attentional information.
Cue phrases that indicate pops to some other space back in
the stack include "but anyway," "anyway," "in any case," and "now
back to..." When the current focus space is popped from the
stack, a space already on the stack becomes most salient. From
the configuration in Figure 6-1, the space with A is popped from
the stack, perhaps with others, and another space on the stack
becomes the top of the stack. Popping back changes the stack
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without creating a new DSP, or a dominance or satisfaction-
precedence relationship. The pop entails a return to an old DSP;
no change is effected in the intentional structure.
There are cue phrases, such as "now" and "next," which
signal a change of attentional state, but do not distinguish
between the creation of a new focus space and the return to an
old one. These words can be used for either move. For example,
in a task-oriented discourse during which some task has been
mentioned but put aside to ask a question, the use of "now"
indicates a change of focus. The utterance following "now,"
however, will either return the discussion to the deferred task
or will introduce some new task for consideration.
Note, finally, that a pop of the focus stack may be achieved
without the use of cue phrases as in the following fragment of a
task-oriented dialogue (Grosz, 1974):
A: One bolt is stuck. I'm trying to use both the
pliers and the wrench to get it unstuck, but
I haven't had much luck.
E: Don't use pliers. Show me what you are doing.
A: I'm pointing at the bolts.
D: Show me the 1/2" combination wrench, please.
A: OK.
E: Good, now show me the 1/2" box wrench.
A: I already got it loosened.
The last utterance in this fragment returns the discourse to
the discussion of the unstuck bolt. The pop can be inferred only
from the content of the main portion of the utterance. The
pronoun (or, more accurately, the fact that it cannot be
referring to the wrench) is a cue that a pop is needed, but only
the reference to the loosening action allows the OCP to recognize
to which discourse segment this utterance belongs, as discussed
by Sidner (1979) and Robinson (1981).
A summary of the uses of cue phrases is given in Figure 6-3.
The cases listed here do not exhaust the changes in focus spaces
Attentional Change
(push) now, next, that reminds me, and, but
(pop to) anyway, but anyway, in any case, now back to
(complete) the end, ok, fine, (paragraph break)
True interruption
I must interrupt, excuse me
Flashbacks
Oops, I forgot.
Digressions
By the way, incidentally, speaking of,
Did you hear about.... That reminds me
Satisfaction-precedes
in the first place, first, second, finally, moreover,
furthermore
New dominance
for example, to wit, first, second, and, moreover,
furthermore, therefore, finally
Figure 6-3: The Uses of Cue Phrases
and in the dominance hierarchy that can be represented--nor have
we furnished a set of rules that specify when cue phrases are
necessary. Additional cases, especially special subcases of
these, may be possible. When discourse is viewed in terms of
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intentional structure and attentional state, it is clearer just
what kinds of information linguistic expressions and intonation
convey to the hearer about the discourse structure. Furthermore,
it is clear that linguistic expressions can function as cue
phrases, as well as sentential connections; they can tell the
hearer about changes in the discourse structure and be carriers
of discourse, rather than sentence-level semantic, meaning.
7. Some Properties and Problems of Discourse-Level Intentions
The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions
of the intentions Grice (1969) considers essential to developing
a theory of utterer's meaning. There is a crucial difference,
however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this
paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice's use of
utterance-level intentik ns. We are not yet addressing the issue
of discourse meaning, but are concerned with the role of DP/DSPs
in determining discourse structure and in specifying how these
intentions can be recognized by an OCP. Although the intentional
structure of a discourse plays a role in determining discourse
meaning, the DP/DSPs do not in and of themselves constitute
discourse segment meaning. The connection between intentional
structure and discourse meaning is similar to that between
attentional and cognitive states; the attentional state plays a
role in a hearer's understanding of what the speaker means by a
given sequence of utterances in a discourse segment, but it is
not the only aspect of cognitive state that contributes to this
understanding.
We will draw upon some particulars of Grice's definition of
utterer's meaning to explain DSPs more fully. His initial
definition is as follows:
"U meant something by uttering x is true iff [for some
audience A]:
1. U intended, by uttering x, to induce a certain response
in A
2. U intended A to recognize, at least in part from the
utterance of x, that U intended to produce that response
3. U intended the fulfillment of the intention mentioned in
(2) to be at least in part A's reason for fulfilling the
intention mentioned in (1).".
Grice refines this definition to address a number of
counterexamples. The following portion of his final definition1 6
is relevant to this paper:
"By uttering x U meant that *p is true iff
(3A) (Hf [features of the utterance]) (Hc [ways of
correlating f with utterances1 7 ]):
(a) U uttered x intending
1. A to think x possesses f
2. A to think f correlated in way c with i-ing that p
3. A to think, on the basis of fulfillment of (1) and (2)
that U intends A to think that U 's that p
4. A on the basis of fulfillment of (3) to think that U 's
that p
5. and (in some cases), A on the basis of fulfillment of
(4) himself to that p."
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Grice takes * p to be the meaning of the utterance, where *
is a mood indicator associated with the propositional attitude u
(e.g., *-assert and =-believe). He considers attitudes like
believing that S is a German soldier and intending to give the
ICP a beer as examples of the kinds of ining that p that utterance
intentions can embed. For expository purposes, we will use the
following notation to represent these utterance-level intentions:
Intend(IOP, Believe(OCP, ICP is a German soldier))
Intend(ICP, Intend(OCP, OCP give ICP a beer))
To extend Grice's definition to discourses, we replace the
utterance x with a discourse segment DS, the utterer U with the
initiator of a discourse segment ICP, and the audience A with the
OCP. To complete this extension, the following problems must be
resolved: (1) specifying the discourse-level intentions and
attitudes that correspond to the utterance-level intentions and V's
that p_ (2) identifying the kinds of fs that contribute to
determining discourse-level intentions; (3) identifying the modes
of correlation (the c's) between features of the discourse
segments and types of discourse-level intentions; (4) specifying
how the discourse-level intentions can be recognized by an OCP.
Although each of these issues is an unresolved problem in
discourse theory, this paper has provided partial answers. The
examples presented illustrate the range of discourse-level
intentions; these intentions appear to be similar to utterance-
level intentions in kind, but differ in that they occur in a
context in which several utterances may be required to ensure
their comprehension and satisfaction. The features so far
identified as conveying information about DSPs are: specific
linguistic markers (e.g., cue phrases, intonation), utterance-
level intentions, and propositional content of the utterances.
We have not explored the problem of identifying modes of
correlation in any detail, but it is clear that those modes that
operate at the utterance level also function at the discourse
level.
As discussed previously, the proper treatment of the
specification of discourse-level intentions is especially
necessary for a computationally useful account of discourse. At
the discourse level, just as at the utterance level, the intended
recognition of intentions plays a central role. The DSPs are
intended to be recognized: They achieve their effects, in part,
because the OCP recognizes the ICP's intention for the OCP to
that p. The OCP's recognition of this intention is crucial to
its achieving the desired effect. In Section 4 we described
certain constraints on the recognition process.
7.1. The Basic Generalization
In extending Grice's analysis to the discourse level, we
have to consider not only individual beliefs and intentions, but
also the relationships among them that arise because of the
relationships among various discourse segments (and utterances
within a segment) and the purposes the segments serve with
respect to the entire discourse. To clarify these relationships,
consider an analogous situation with nonlinguistic actions.
18 An
action may divide into several subactions; for example, the
planting of a rose bush divides into preparing the soil, digging a
hole, placing the rose bush in the hole, filling the rest of the
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hole with soil, and watering the ground around the bush. The
intention to perform the planting action includes several
subsidiary intentions (one for each of the subactions--namely, to
do it).
In discourse, in a manner that is analogous to nonlinguistic
actions, the DP (and some DSPs) includes several subsidiary
intentions related to the DSPs it dominates. For purposes of
exposition, we will use the term primary intention to distinguish
the overall intention of the DP from the subsidiary intentions of
the DP. For example in the movies argument of Section 3.1, the
primary intention is for the reader to come to believe that
parents and teachers should keep children from seeing too many
movies; in the task dialogue of Section 3.2, the intention is
that the apprentice remove the flywheel. Subsidiary intentions
include, respectively, the intention that the reader believe that
it is important to evaluate movies and the intention that the
expert help the apprentice locate the second setscrew.
Because the beliefs and intentions of at least two different
participants are involved in discourse, two properties of the
general-action situation (assuming a single agent performs all
actions) do not carry over. First, in a discourse, the ICP
intends the OCP to recognize the ICP's beliefs about the
connections among various propositions and actions. For example,
in the movies argument, the reader (OCP) is intended to recognize
that the author (ICP) believes some propositions provide support
for others; in the task dialogue the expert (ICP) intends the
apprentice (OCP) to recognize that the expert believes the
performance of certain actions contributes to the performance of
other actions. In contrast, in the general-action situation in
which there is no communication, there is no need for recognition
of another agent's beliefs about the interrelationship of various
actions and intentions.
The second difference concerns the extent to which the
subsidiary actions or intentions specify the overall action or
intention. To perform some action, the agent must perform each
of the subactions involved; by performing all of these
subactions the agent performs the action. In contrast in a
discourse, the participants share the assumption of discourse
sufficiency: It is a convention of the communicative situation
that the ICP believes the discourse is sufficient to achieve the
primary intention of the DP. Discourse sufficiency does not
entail logical sufficiency or action completeness. It is not
necessarily the case that satisfaction of all of the DSPs is
sufficient in and of itself for satisfaction of the DP. Rather,
there is an assumption that the information conveyed in the
discourse will suffice in conjunction with other information the
ICP believes the OCP has (or can obtain) to allow for
satisfaction of the primary intention of the DP. Satisfaction of
all of the DSPs, in conjunction with this additional information,
is enough for satisfaction of the DP. Hence, in discourse the
intentional structure (the analogue of the action hierarchy) need
not be complete.
For example, the propositions expressed in the movies essay
to not provide a logically sufficient proof of the claim. The
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author furnishes information that he believes to be adequate for
the reader to reach the desired conclusion and assumes the reader
will supplement what is actually said with appropriate additional
information and reasoning. Likewise, the task dialogue does not
mention all the subtasks for which some instruction is needed or
in connection with which some problem arises.
To be more concrete, we will look at the extension of the
Gricean analysis for two particular cases, one involving a
belief, the other an intention to perform some action. We will
consider only the simplest situations, in which the primary
intentions of the DP/DSPs are about either beliefs or actions,
but not a mixture. Although the task dialogue obviously involves
a mixture, this is an extremely complicated issue that demands
additional research.
7.2. The Belief Case
In the belief case, the primary intention of the DP is to
get the OCP to believe some proposition, say p. Each of the
discourse segments is also intended to get the OCP to believe a
proposition, say qi for some i-l,...,n (where there are n
discourse segments). In addition to the primary intention--i.e.,
that the OCP should come to believe p--the DP includes an
intention that the OCP come to believe each of the qi and, in
addition, an intention that the OCP come to believe the qiprovide
support for p. We can represent this schematically as:19
Vi=l,...,n Intend (ICP, Believe(OCP,p)A
Believe(OCP,qi)A
Believe(OCP, Supports (p, qlA..Aqn)))
There are several things to note here. To begin with, the
first intention, (Intend ICP (Believe (OCP p)), is the primary
component of the DSP. Second, each of,the intended beliefs in the
second conjunct corresponds to the primary component of the DSP
of some embedded discourse segment. Third, the supports relation
is not implication. The OCP is not intended to believe that the
qi imply p, but rather to believe that the qi in conjunction with
other facts and rules that the ICP assumes the OCP has available
or can obtain and thus come to believe are sufficient for the OCP
to conclude p. Fourth, the DP/DSP may only be completely
determined at the end of the discourse (segment), as we discussed
in Section 4.
Finally, to determine how the discourse segments
corresponding to the qi are related to the one corresponding to
p, the OCP only has to believe that the ICP believes a supports
relationship holds. Hence, for the purpose of recognizing the
discourse structure, it would be sufficient for the third clause
to be
. . . Believe(OCP, Believe(ICP, Supports (p, qi^ * Aq)))
However, the DP of a belief-case discourse is not merely to get
the OCP to believe p, but to get the OCP to believe p by virtue
of believing the qi. That this is so can be seen clearly by
considering situations in which the OCP already believes p and is
known by the ICP to do so, but does not have a good reason for
believing p. This last property of the belief case is not shared
by the action case.
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There is an important relationship between the supports
relation and the dominance relation that can hold between
DP/DSPs; it is captured in the following rule (using the same
notation as above):
Vi=l,...,n Intend(CPI , Believe(CP2 ,p))A
Intend(CP1, Believe(CP2 ,qi))A
Believe(CP1 , Supports(p, qiA...Aqn)) <->
DOM(Intend(CPI , Believe(CP2,p))
Intend(CPI , Believe(CP2 ,qi)))
The implication in the forward direction states that if a
conversational participant (CP0) believes that the proposition p
is supported by the proposition qi, and he intends another
participant (CP2) to adopt these beliefs, then his intention that
CP2 believe p dominates his intention that CP2 believe qi..
Viewed intuitively, CP1 's belief that qi provides support for p,
underlies his intention to get CP2 to believe p by getting him to
believe qi. The satisfaction of CPI's intention that CP2 should
believe qi will help satisfy CPI's intention that CP2 believe p.
This relationship plays a role in the recognition of DSPs.
7.3. The Action Case
An analogous situation holds for a discourse segment
comprising utterances intended to get the OCP to perform some set
of actions directed at achieving some overall task (e.g., some
segments in the task-oriented dialogue of Section 3.2). The full
specification of the DP/DSP contains a generates relation that is
derived from a relation defined by Goldman (1970). For this
case, the DP/DSPs are of the following form:
Vi-l,...,n Intend(ICP, Intend(OCP, Do(A))A
Intend(OCP, Do(ai))A
Believe(OCP, Believe(ICP, Generates(A, al/%..
Aan))))
Each intention to act represented in the second conjunct
corresponds to the primary intention of some discourse segment.
Like supports, the generates relation is partial (its
partiality distinguishes it in part from Goldman's relation).
Thus, the OCP is not intended to believe that the ICP believes
that performance of ai alone is sufficient for performance of A,
but rather that doing all of the ai and other actions that the
OCP can be expected to know or figure out constitutes a
performance of A. In the task dialogue of Section 3.2 many
actions that are essential to the task (e.g., the apprentice
picking up the Allen wrench and applying it correctly to the
setscrews) are never even mentioned in the dialogue.
Note that it is unnecessary for the ICP or OCP to have a
complete plan relating all of the ai to A at the start of the
discourse (or discourse segment). All that is required is that,
for any given segment, the OCP be able to determine what
intention to act the segment corresponds to and which other
intentions dominate that intention. Finally, unlike the belief
case, the third conjunct here requires only that the OCP
recognize that the ICP believes a generates relationship holds.
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The OCP can do A by virtue of doing the ai without coming himself
to believe anything about the relationships between A and the ai.
As in the belief case, there is an equivalence that links
the generates relation among actions to the dominance relation
between intentions. Schematically, it is as follows:
Vi=l,...,n [Intend(CP1 , Intend(CP2 , Do(A)))A
Intend(CP1 , Intend(CP2 , Do(ai)))A
Believe(CP1 , Generates(A,AaI ...Aan))] <->
DOM(Intend(CPI , Intend(CP2 , Do(A)))
Intend(CP1 , Intend(CP 2 , Do(ai))))
This equivalence states that, if an agent (CPI) believes
that the performance of some action (ail) contributes in part to
the performance of another action (A), and if CPI intends for CP2
to (intend to) do both of these actions, then his intention that
CP2 (intend to) perform ai is dominated by his intention that CP2
(intend to) perform A. Viewed intuitively, CPI's belief that
doing ai will contribute to doing A underlies his intention to
get CP2 to do A by getting CP2 to do ai. The satisfaction of
CPI's intention for CP2 to do ai will help satisfy CP1 's
intention for CP2 to do A.
So, for example, in the task-oriented dialogue of Section
3.2, the expert knows that using the wheelpuller is a necessary
part of removing the flywheel. His intention that the apprentice
intend to use the wheelpuller is thus dominated by his intention
that the apprentice intend to take off the flywheel.
Satisfaction of the intention to use the wheelpuller will
contribute to satisfying the intention to remove the flywheel.
In general, the action ai does not have to be a necessary action
though it is in this example (at least if the task is done
correctly).
A definitive statement characterizing primary and subsidiary
intentions for task-oriented dialogues awaits further research
not only in discourse theory, but also in the theory of
intentions and actions. In particular, a clearer statement of
the interactions among the intentions of the various discourse
participants (with respect to both linguistic and nonlinguistic
actions) awaits the formulation of a better theory of cooperation
and multiagent activity.
7.4. Rhetorical Relations
We are now in a position to contrast the role of DP/DSPs,
supports, generates, DOM, and SP in our theory with the
rhetorical relations that, according to a number of alternative
theories (e.g., Grimes, 1975; Hobbs, 1979; Mann & Thompson,
1983; Reichman, 1984; and McKeown, 1985), are claimed to underlie
discourse structure. Among the various rhetorical relations that
have been investigated are elaboration, summarization,
enablement, justification, and challenge. Although the theories
each identify different specific relations, they all use such
relations as the basis for determining discourse structure.
These rhetorical relations apply specifically to linguistic
behavior and most of them implicitly incorporate intentions
(e.g., the intention to summarize, the intention to justify).
The intentions that typically serve as DP/DSPs in our theory are
more basic than those that underlie such rhetorical relations in
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that they are not specialized for linguistic behavior; in many
cases, their satisfaction can be realized by extralinguistic
actions as well as linguistic ones.
The supports and generates relations that must sometimes be
inferred to determine domination are also more basic than
rhetorical relations; they are general relations that hold
between propositions and actions. Hence, the inferring of
relationships such as supports and generates is simpler than that
of rhetorical relationships. The determination of whether a
supports or generates relationship exists depends only on facts
of how the world is, not on facts of the discourse. In contrast,
the recognition of rhetorical relations requires the combined use
of discourse and domain information.
For several reasons, rhetorical relationships do not have a
privileged status in the account given here. Although they
appear to provide a metalevel description of the discourse, their
role in discourse interpretation remains unclear. As regards
discourse processing, it seems obvious that the ICP and OCP have
essentially different access to them. In particular, the ICP may
well have such rhetorical relationships "in mind" as he produces
utterances (as in McKeown's system) (McKeown, 1985), whereas it
is much less clear when (if at all) the OCP infers them. A claim
of the theory being developed in this paper is that a discourse
can be understood at a basic level even if the OCP never does or
can construct, let alone name, such rhetorical relationships.
Furthermore, it appears that these relationships could be recast
as a combination of domain-specific information, general
relations between propositions and actions (e.g., supports and
generates), and general relations between intentions (e.g.,
domination and satisfaction-precedence).20 Even so, rhetorical
relationships are, in all likelihood, useful to the theoretician
as an analytical tool for certain aspects of discourse analysis.
8. Conclusions and Future Research
The theory of discourse structure presented in this paper is
a generalization of theories of task-oriented dialogues. It
differs from previous generalizations in that it carefully
distinguishes three components of discourse structure: one
linguistic, one intentional, and one attentional. This
distinction provides an essential basis for explaining
interruptions, cue phrases, and referring expressions.
The particular intentional structure used also differs from
the analogous aspect of previous generalizations. Although, like
those generalizations, it supplies the principal framework for
discourse segmentation and determines structural relationships
for the focusing structure (part of the attentional state),
unlike its predecessors it does not depend on the special details
of any single domain or type of discourse.
Although admittedly still incomplete, the theory does
provide a solid basis for investigating both the structure and
meaning of discourse, as well as for constructing discourse-
processing systems. Several difficult research problems remain
to be explored. Of these, we take the following to be of primary
importance:
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1. Specification of the relationship between discourse-
level (DP/DSP) and utterance-level intentions;
2. Identification of the information that discourse
participants use to recognize these intentions, and the
ways in which they utilize it;
3. Development of an adequate treatment of the interaction
among intentions of multiple participants;
4. Investigation of the effect of multiple DSPs on the
theory;
5. Investigation of alternative models of attentional
state.
Finally, the theory suggests several important conjectures.
First, that a discourse is coherent only when its discourse
purpose is shared by all the participants and when each utterance
of the discourse contributes to achieving this purpose, either
directly or indirectly, by contributing to the satisfaction of a
discourse segment purpose. Second, general intuitions about
"topic" correspond most closely to DP/DSPs, rather than to
syntactic or attentional concepts. Finally, the theory suggests
that the same intentional structure can give rise to different
attentional structures through different discourses. The
different attentional structures will be manifest in part because
different referring expressions will be valid, and, in part,
because different cue phrases and other indicators will be
necessary, optional, or redundant.
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Footnotes
1
The use of the phrase "linguistic structure" to refer to
the structure of sequences of utterances is a natural extension
of its use in traditional linguistic theories to refer to the
syntactic structure of individual sentences. To avoid confusion
the phrase "linguistic structure" will be used in this paper only
to refer to the structure of a sequence of utterances composing a
discourse or discourse segment.
2
He has also reported that the subjects did not label
segments nearly so consistently. We believe this fact is related
to the kinds of relations the labels were dependent upon. As
discussed in Section 4.1, there is a difference between the
intentional structure we describe and the relations that others
use.
3
Referring expressions can also be used to mark a discourse
boundary. For example, novelists sometimes use pronouns to
indicate a new scene in a story.
4
These two relations are similar to ones that play a role in
parsing at the sentence level: immediate dominance and linear
precedence. However, the dominance relation, like the one in
Marcus and Hindle's D-theory (Marcus, Hindel, & Fleck, 1983), is
partial (i.e., nonimmediate).
5
Even in the task case the orderings may be partial. In
fact, the systems built for task-oriented dialogues (Robinson,
1981; Walker, 1978) did not use a prebuilt tree, but constructed
the tree--based on a partially-ordered model--only as a given
discourse evolved.
6
The observant reader will note that this was written in the
early days of the cinema, before the advent of sound; hence the
quotation marks around "movies." Note also that utterance (7)
contains a somewhat odd preposition, utterance and (16) somewhat
odd definite noun phrases. We have quoted the text exactly as it
was printed.
7 The segmentation omits some levels of detail. For example,
utterances 19-24 are a segment within DS5. Rather than present
this detail, we concentrate on the larger segments here so as to
focus on the major issues with which this paper is concerned.
8 This modification "folds in" an informing action with the
request. Such combining of two types of speech acts is similar
to the action subsumption that Appelt (1985) discusses in regard
to referring expressions.
9 Hirschberg and Pierrehumbert (1986) have shown recently
that intonational features, most notably pitch range, can also
be used to indicate discourse segment boundaries.
10
We assume here that the OCP must recognize intentions
rather than actions. The argument that such is the case is
beyond the scope of this paper. At a very general level, it
centers on the possibility that the very same sequence of
[utterance] actions will correspond to two different discourse
structures with the difference statable only in terms of the
ICP's intentions. The possibility of such sequences was
suggested to us by Michael Bratman [personal communication]. The
irony contained in such a clause as "you're a real sweetheart"
illustrates the need to consider intentions.
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11
This knowledge may be available prior to the discourse or
from information supplied by previous utterances in the
discourse.
12
This boundary is clearly atypical of stacks. It suggests
that ultimately the stack model is not quite what is needed.
What structure should replace the stack remains unclear to us.
13
Because this is so clearly the case on other grounds, the
segment boundary is obvious even to a reader after the fact.
14
From just the fragment presented, all that can be
determined is that the two dominates relationships are domination
but not direct domination.
"OK" is many ways ambiguous. It .may also mean (at least)
"I heard what you said," "I heard and intend to do what you
intend me to intend," "I am done what I undertook to do," or "I
approve what you are about to do."
16
This portion is taken from Redefinition IVB: A further
redefinition deals with abstracting about audience and would
unnecessarily complicate our initial view of intentions and
discourse.
1 7Grice (1969) mentions iconic, conventional, and
associative modes, giving examples of each.
18
This analogy is meant to help clarify and motivate the
discussion. Although it also suggests some important problems in
common between research on discourse and research on theories of
action and intention, those issues are the subject of another
paper.
1 9
Here again we use a notational shorthand rather than a
formal language to make some of the relationships clearer.
20
This claim reflects a move analogous to the one made by
Cohen and Levesque (Cohen & Levesque, 1985) in showing that the
definitions of various speech acts can be derived as lemmas
within a general theory of rational behavior.
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